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Defining institutions: taking history seriously 
ABSTRACT 
 This paper suggests an alternative list of institutions to that commonly encountered in 
the literature on institutional logics. This is done as a response to calls for greater clarity 
about basic terms. The resources of history are drawn upon to formulate the suggested 
candidates for the status of institution, with brief outlines for each of some key attributes. It is 
argued that the proposed specification would enhance the possibilities for comparative 
analysis. 
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Defining institutions: taking history seriously 
 
Considerable progress has been made in elaborating the notion of institutional logics, both in 
specifying how they might operate and how that operation might be conditioned at different 
levels of activity. There is now a voluminous journal literature and a valuable book length 
summary of this progress (Thornton, Occasio and Lounsbury, 2012). But the nagging doubt 
remains: what are these institutions in which logics operate? There is a danger that the 
unexamined nature of this questions means that institutions become taken for granted, as in 
the following: ‘At the societal level, scholars delineate seven distinct institutional orders and 
associated logics: family, community, religion, state, market, profession, and corporation’ 
(Besharov and Smith, 2014: 365). This is taken directly from the Thornton, Occasio and 
Lounsbury text as if this were unproblematic but, as I hope to show, the basis for this list is 
by no means as clear as might be thought. This article seeks to address this question, by a 
return, via Friedland and Alford’s seminal 1991 contribution, to Weber. I take institutions to 
be enduring combinations of material practices and symbolic constructions, relatively few in 
number, operating at the societal level and conditioning human activity. I propose to address 
the question of the definition of institutions by looking at history, not just as a source of 
evidence, but also as a conceptual resource, by looking at how historians have approached the 
topic. I show that this results in a different list of institutions which has consequences for how 
we view organizations. 
I start by considering why this enterprise of definition is necessary, arguing that comparative 
analysis and questions of change require more clarity. I outline some of the broader resources 
that I draw upon, notably the recent work of Roger Friedland (2009) on the connection 
between logics and practice and the social theorist Margaret Archer and her advocacy of the 
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necessity of analytical narratives of emergence (1995).  This frames a consideration of some 
alternative approaches to the formulation of institutions, notably the comparative business 
systems perspective (Whitley, 1999) and the ‘orders of worth’ proposed by Boltanski and 
Thevenot (2006). I give my reasons for preferring to act on a suggestion by Thornton, 
Occasio and Lounsbury (2012: 66) that Weber’s discussion of value spheres might offer a 
promising line of inquiry. Using his formulation as a starting point, I consider a number of 
candidates for the status of institution, drawing on the work of historians. I argue for these 
candidates on the basis of their enduring status and their relation to some aspect of how 
humans have interacted with each other and the world and made sense of such interactions. 
Having done so, I discuss some of the struggles within the institutions I have identified, with 
special reference to particular conjunctions of time and space. I conclude by returning to the 
implications for our study of organizations, arguing that the approach essayed here enable us 
to maintain firmly a focus on institutions at the societal level that condition organizational 
activity. 
COMPETING PERSPECTIVES 
It could be argued that the search for definitions is a quixotic endeavour, condemned to 
failure. On a strong version of this argument, concepts need only to be contextualised to the 
situation at hand, with the argument for their validity being confined to their usefulness for 
analysis. A weaker version would recognise the need for more clarity, but prefer to hand it off 
to other disciplines and keep the notion of institution as a vague but helpful resource to be 
called upon as needed. As Greenwood et al (2008: 14) note ‘Much like the early days of 
organization theory, when a tacit  agreement occurred to stop attempting to define 
'organization', there emerged an unwritten assumption that we intuitively know what we 
mean by institution and thus have no further need to define it’. They do, however, go on to 
suggest the need for the development of ‘a more common vocabulary’. The danger of not 
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having such a vocabulary is the snowballing of forms of logic, each adapted to a particular 
situation but with no common point of reference. Even more problematic is the tendency to 
relativise logics to a particular level, most notably that of the field. With that, the whole 
enterprise of Friedland and Alford (1991) of ‘bringing society back in’ is lost, with a focus on 
only those forces which directly impinge on economic activity. The danger, as I hope to 
show, is that this means neglecting broader changes in society that have profound 
implications for organizations and organizing.  
However, this raises another concern, to do with the disciplinary division of labour. It might 
be conceded that this definitional enterprise is justified, but that it is not the province of 
organizational scholars; indeed, that it might divert such scholars from their primary focus 
(Kraatz and Block, 2008: 247). The point is well made, but experience suggests that, 
especially with the sheer volume of publications, that scholars tend to get trapped within their 
own discipline, not being able to lift their heads up to take in the broader picture (Suddaby et 
al, 2010: 1239). Intellectual endeavour, also, should not be a one way street, in which 
organizational scholars wait for the intellectual advances of their sociological colleagues. I 
draw in this article on what is perhaps a wider range of literature than usually encountered 
with the ambition of re-orienting the debate back towards some of the broader issues. 
I start, however, with the summary of the development of institutional logics provided by 
Thornton, Occasio and Lounsbury (2012). This is in part because of its influence on the 
debate in this journal and elsewhere and in part because of an intriguing suggestion that is 
made in the course of their discussion of Friedland and Alford. They note that, to their 
surprise, Friedland and Alford did not reference aspects of Weber’s work, notably his notion 
of value spheres. ‘Weber,’ Thornton et al note, ‘ identified several life-orders or what he 
termed value-spheres, for example the economic, political, esthetic, erotic, and intellectual 
spheres’ (Thornton, Occasio and Lounsbury, 2012: 66). Friedland has returned to these 
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distinctions in later work, which I discuss in due course, but this is a valuable suggestion 
which I return to later. For now, however, problems with the way institutions are defined 
necessitate a brief review and critique of the way Thornton et al arrive at their categories. 
This is because they, in turn, have some fairly pointed things to say about Friedland and 
Alford. For example, they point out that ‘The influences of the professions, which both 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) so clearly laid out, are 
mysteriously absent’ (Thornton, Occasio and Lounsbury, 2012: 66).  What, however, makes 
this ‘mysterious’? There are clearly criteria for such a judgment being deployed, but they are 
not articulated. What this seems to rest on is the volume of published material, which I will 
argue is an insecure basis for judgment. The same could be said about the next observation, 
which is that ‘Also absent is the institutional order of the corporation’ (Thornton, Occasio 
and Lounsbury, 2012: 66). After all, it could be argued that the corporation is a historically 
specific organizational form, one which, while powerful in its time, is open to replacement by 
other forms (Davis, 2009). Finally, the observation is made that Thornton  
further questioned the reasoning of qualifying the institutional order of the state as the 
"bureaucratic state". Isn't bureaucracy an organizational form used by the state to 
carry out its objectives. Couldn't other institutional orders be characterized as 
bureaucratic as well? (Thornton, Occasio and Lounsbury, 2012: 67). 
That is a fair point, and it could be further argued that if we turn to the literature on the state 
that of rather more centrality is the notion of the ‘nation state’. However, if we accept this 
point, then can we not turn the same argument back on the professions? Indeed Boltanski and 
Thevenot (2066: 292) seem to be making this point when they note that ‘a person's 
profession, considered to be a fundamental attribute in a great number of situations, remains a 
passageway between worths and an object of tension’. That is, for them, profession is a cross-
cutting term which is deployed with different inflections in several of their ‘orders of worth’.  
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In other words, the status of the categories proposed by Thornton et al seems to be based on 
some unarticulated assumptions, one of which appears to be the sheer volume of work 
emanating from the organizational literature. These seem to be shaky foundations for 
considering societal level institutions where, arguably, the need is to work from the ‘outside’ 
in rather than the reverse. 
For this reason, I wish to go back to Friedland and Alford, and beyond them to Weber, but 
first I need to consider some alternative approaches, two of which place institutions firmly at 
the level of society. The field of institutional economics, largely based on the work of 
Douglas North, operates with a clear notion of  institutions at a supra-organizational level 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 9). However, it operates on a view of institutions as repairing 
market imperfections, tending to a view of institutions as the regulations which condition 
economic activity. A more socially aware model, but one which still has economic activity as 
its prime focus, is the comparative business systems tradition (Whitley, 2000). This seeks to 
identify clusters of inter-connected institutions that shape economic activity. Such clusters are 
associated with zones of economic activity which might cross state boundaries. The 
institutions which are focused on are ‘the state, the financial, educational and training 
systems, the labour market regime and norms and values governing trust and authority 
relationships’ (Djelic and Quack, 2008: 304). What is valuable in this approach is the 
specification of institutions at a level of generality such that they are not bounded by one 
particular location, something which can be a concern in much of the work on institutional 
logics. However, the status of culture in this approach is something of a residual term. 
The second alternative is that presented by Boltanski and Thevenot (2006) in their work on 
justification. This proposes a number of ‘orders of worth’ and has been influential in the 
French school examining the sociology of conventions (Cloutier and Langley, 2013). They 
propose a number of such orders of worth or ‘worlds: these are inspired, domestic, fame, 
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civic, market, and industrial. They suggest that each is drawn upon when persons justify their 
actions, giving them a sense of worth and identity. There are some suggestive elements to 
this, but there are also critiques to do with the derivation of these orders. For the purpose of 
this article, however, it is sufficient to recognise, as the authors do, that ‘The model of 
justification we have presented here in its broad outlines does not claim to account for the 
behavior of actors in any and all situations they may encounter’ (Boltanski and Thevenot, 
2006: 347).  Importantly, they note that  
The act of bypassing justice and behaving only as one pleases, without being 
burdened by the requirement to explain, is the defining act of violence. But by the 
same token, such acts fall outside the scope of our research (Boltanski and Thevenot, 
2006: 37).   
I will argue that this means that this excludes considerable of an important institution, that of 
the military. Because of this, I focus on the suggestions made by Friedland and Alford 
(1991). 
A starting point is to return to the emphasis in Friedland and Alford (1991) on their advocacy 
of a model of institutional spheres, each with their own logics and possessing relative 
autonomy. This is important as presenting an alternative to more materialist interpretations of 
society drawing on interpretations of Marxism which operated on a widely discredited model 
of base and superstructure. In this, cultural constructions were built on a material base and, in 
the crudest forms, were simply a mirror of material interests. Friedland and Alford (1991) 
were anxious to preserve autonomy for their institutional spheres, whilst recognising inter-
connections. It is also important to remember, in the context of our earlier discussion, that 
this was a view from outside the world of organizational studies, indeed one in which religion 
and the lessons derived from its study were of considerable importance. This is why the 
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professions and the corporation were not included; from an ‘external’ vantage point they 
were simply not significant enough. In this regard, Friedland and Alford (1991) were 
consistent with major currents in social theory. One which provides some of the broader 
conceptual resources on which this article is based is the work of Margaret Archer (1995). 
Her realist social theory, based on the resources of critical realism, is an extensive body of 
work; for the present purpose what is important is her focus on emergence and the 
importance of history. Society is activity dependent, but once emergent from activity, both 
structure and culture escape their conditions of production and become the context in which 
agents develop their projects. The combination of these emergent structural and cultural 
properties forms situational logics which shape but do not determine conduct. Because of this 
focus on emergence and history, Archer advocates the construction of what she terms 
‘analytical narratives of emergence’. As an example, she refers to the work of Norbert Elias 
on the emergence of norms of ‘civilised’ conduct over centuries. Her own comparative work 
on educational systems covered four countries over some 600 years (Archer, 1979). That 
provides the orientation to history that is developed below. 
Roger Friedland has also developed his ideas, in part through a turn to precisely that aspect of 
Weber’s work that was noted as being passed over above. He has also developed a view of 
the internal life of institutions, drawing on an Aristotelian notion of substance. Derived from 
this he suggests that an institutional logic is “a bundle of practices organized around a 
particular substance and its secondary derivatives from which the normativity of those 
practices is derived” (Friedland, 2009: 61). Further, those practices are central to the creation 
and maintenance of substance, which cannot be directly observed but which is “immanent in 
the practices that organize an institutional field, values never exhausted by those practices, 
practices premised on faith” (Friedland, 2009: 61). This is the warrant for returning to Weber, 
to see if in his value spheres we can reformulate our notions of what constitutes institutions.  
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Weber’s essay on ‘religious rejections of the world and their directions’, first published in 
1915, took as its starting point Indian religious forms, the most developed form, he argued, of 
religion rejecting the world (Gerth and Mills, 1948). In order to do this, he suggested a 
number of ideal types of ‘life orders’ against which to contrast the claims of religion. These 
value spheres consisted of different ways of being in the world and Weber considered them in 
turn to explore the tensions between them and religion. These spheres of value were: kinship; 
economic; political; aesthetic; erotic and intellectual. Interestingly, in another essay published 
in the same collection, an extract from Economy and Society, our attention is drawn to the 
importance of the military in providing the template for the wider importance of discipline in 
the modern world. If we turn to the work of a historian whose work we will draw upon in 
more detail below, the Dutch art historian Jacob Huizinga, we can see an echo of these 
categories when he comments that ‘while in the more highly organized forms of society 
religion, science, law, war and politics gradually lose touch with play, the function of the poet 
still remains fixed in the play-sphere where it was born’ (Huizinga, 1949: 119). We see that 
for a cultural historian war was an important category, as was another missing from Weber’s 
list, that of law. This gives us a list of nine potential institutions to examine, all of which, it 
will be contended, involve some aspect of humans interacting with each other or their world 
and seeking to make sense of it. Before turning to these, however, some brief words on 
history and historians are in order. 
 
 ‘History’ can have a dual sense; it is about both the past and about how historians have 
presented that past (Rowlinson, Hassard and Decker, 2014). History here is seen in the sense 
of what Bergson terms ‘duration’, ‘the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the 
future and which swells as it advances’ (Bergson, 1960: 5). This is not time as a variable, but 
history as irreversible. Of course, historians have their different interpretations of that past. 
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They are notoriously resistant to theorizing their categories, rather building them into the very 
fabric of the narratives they construct. (An exception is William Sewell (2005), whose Logics 
of History, especially through his engagement with Giddens’ structuration theory, has been 
influential in broader debates in social theory). This means that a historian like Huizinga will 
tend to simply assume the status of the concepts that he outlines in the quotation given above. 
But the work of such historians is incredibly valuable in indicating what is durable over large 
swathes of time, so providing us with an alternative to the ways in which institutions have 
been rather assumed in the existing literature. I now turn to examine each of the spheres of 
value that I outlined above, looking at both the light that history can shed on them and how 
we might need to modify them to come up with a set of institutions for the analysis of 
contemporary organizations. I examine them in the order that Weber attended to them with 
some slight modifications that will be explained as I progress. I conclude with two that were 
not covered in his engagement with religious rejections of the world. I cannot pretend here 
the reach of a Weber or a Huizinga. In particular, I need to recognise at this stage that the 
histories I draw upon tend to a focus on the West, on Europe and, within that, on the UK. 
That is because as a working historian my focus has been on those areas. In addition, as will 
be seen, sources which pay close attention to practices as understood here are often difficult 
to come by. The discussion is, therefore, provisional, tentative and corrigible. However, the 
attempt seems worth risking in order to push the debate forward. 
INSTITUTIONS OUTLINED 
‘My God’: religion 
There are a number of reasons for starting this discussion with religion. Its continuing 
importance in the world, despite the claims for secularisation, would by itself merit greater 
attention than perhaps is evident in the organizational literature. It was clearly Weber’s 
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starting point and not only because of its social prominence. It was because it not only left its 
traces even when belief had waned, as we will see, but because the spirit of religion, in the 
words ‘faith’ and ‘belief’, animated the other spheres. That is, as Friedland points out, even in 
the most ‘rational’ of enterprises there is a core of belief in an animating principle. ‘For 
Weber,’ he argues, ‘institutions are religious in the sense that they bind their adherents 
through faith, sacrifice, and passion’ (Friedland, 2014: 219). However, what historical studies 
also indicate is the way in which large areas of what are now predominantly secular activities 
have been carved out of religion. This is particularly the case, as we will explore below, with 
law and learning.  
In his broader consideration of world religions, Weber considered five: Confucianism, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. To this list he also added consideration of 
Judaism. To consider such a range of religions across space and time demanded a formidable 
range of knowledge. It meant that Weber’s focus was often on belief as expressed in 
programmatic statements. Indeed, for one commentator on his work ‘in all social phenomena 
it is the non-everyday that interests him, that which bursts through everyday life.’ (Hennis, 
1988: 181). However, particularly under the influence of Foucault, it is possible for historians 
to focus on just that importance of the everyday to the sustaining of institutional logics. Philip 
Gorski (2003), for example, has pushed back the origins of the ‘disciplinary revolution’ to 
seventeenth century Netherlands, arguing that Reformed Protestantism necessitated particular 
practices in order to be able to function, practices which could subsequently form templates 
for activities in other domains. There are actually hints of such a focus in Weber’s work on 
sects where, for example, he considers the organizational implications of closed communion 
(Gerth and Mills, 1948: 312). This was where the central sacrament of communion was only 
available to those confirmed as worthy to receive it, which required tests of worthiness and 
means of recording it (Schmidt, 2001). Such means, elaborated in particular in Scottish 
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Presbyterianism, then formed taken for granted principles of organizing which translated into 
other places, notably the USA of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
This focus on religion as a social practice is made especially vivid because of the character of 
religious practice as ritual. Students of such rituals in the European Middle Ages have argued 
that it is misleading to ‘read off’ rituals from formal programmatic statements (Clark, 2004: 
126). Rituals take on their power not from any shared agreement on theological statements 
but from their performance, out of which a shared sense of belief emerges (Whitehouse, 
2004: 93). In more contemporary terms, this is the ‘doing church’ of Creed, DeJordy and 
Lok’s (2010) Protestant adherents in the USA. In turn, such shared activities become a 
powerful sense of identity. Thus Baltzell recounts the story of an eminent Boston Unitarian 
commenting to an Episcopalian friend, ‘Eliza, do you kneel down in church and call yourself 
a miserable sinner? Neither I nor any member of my family will ever do that!’ (emphasis in 
original) (Baltzell, 1979: 367). 
What we see historically is a progressive ‘carving out’ of new value spheres from religion, 
although often leaving its traces in these spheres. This is particularly the case where practices 
originally animated by belief become detached from that belief and are accepted as the taken 
for granted ways of carrying out activities.  Thus the ‘culture of organization’ which Peter 
Hall (1998) sees as characterizing the post-bellum United States with its origins in varieties 
of Protestantism and Judaism, which contributes to the rise of corporations. Thus also the 
enduring tension between value spheres, animated by belief in its central substance. 
‘What’s love got to do with it?’ The family 
For Weber, ‘the first power with which [religious communities] have come into conflict has 
been the natural sib’ (Gerth and Mills, 1948: 328-9). This is because the new community 
demands the full commitment and adherence of its believers, forcing them to break the ties of 
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kinship and replicate them with their new ‘family’. There are strong parallels in this focus on 
kinship with the ‘domestic world’ of Boltanski and Thevenot (2006), in which the markers of 
worth are words such as ‘respect’, ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’. This focus on hierarchical 
ordering does seem in large measure to reflect the particular source they use (a manual with a 
strong stress on etiquette) and it does not feature the animating power of love. Weber 
separates this out under the particular heading of erotic love. This is because of its sharp 
tension with the ecstatic belief of other worldly religion. For our purposes, however, it seems 
better to think of the family as the institutional sphere with love as its animating purpose. 
Families, of course, comprise more than love, more indeed than honour; they can also be sites 
of violence and humiliation. But if we consider institutions in Friedland’s (2009) terms as a 
bundle of practices animated by a central substance, then love, certainly as an ideal, seems 
the appropriate candidate.  
What historians would suggest is the evolving nature of this central substance accompanied 
by changes in practices. We see first the emergence of courtly love, available only to the 
nobility of Europe but then generalised to an ideal of romantic love through the efforts of 
poets and playwrights. All the time this is in tension with the demands of kinship, but, 
certainly in large parts of the West, the ideal of companionate love came to represent the key 
animating factor. During this process practices such as marriage underwent considerable 
changes in content but retained their essential character. Despite the concerns of a thinker like 
Foucault (1997), excluded groups have not developed alternative practices but have, by and 
large, clamoured for inclusion under the old rubric. The resilience of the family as an 
institution seems to suggest something of a cautionary tale about the use of a term like 
‘institutional change’. While practices might change over relatively short periods, the 
institution itself may prove much more impervious to change. In some parts of the world, for 
example, the practice of marriage has been rejected by other groups, often in ever larger 
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numbers, but the family with its relatively enduring commitments seems to answer certain 
human needs. At least no powerful alternative to what seem to be characteristic needs for 
companionship and connection seems to have emerged.  
The family is the institution in which the relationship between the substance and the practices 
seems at its most immediate, relatively unmediated by other forms, such as organizations, 
which are proper to the institutional sphere itself. There are plenty of such forces from other 
institutional spheres seeking to mould the family, from law courts to church bodies, each 
claiming and contesting jurisdiction. But it seems misleading to conceive of the family itself 
as an organization. One could argue that under certain arrangements the household is a form 
of organization, especially when it contains unrelated members, such as servants. This is 
clearest in farming environments, where the family farm is at once an economic unit and the 
site for the production of family practices. But even here there seems a secular trend towards 
such organizational forms converging with those in other spheres, notably the economy. So it 
is better to speak of the family inflecting those organizational forms, such as in the family 
firm, rather than treating such forms as proper to the institutional sphere of the family. 
‘Money, money, money’: the economy 
What to say of the economy? It is the core of the institutionalist project that not only are there 
cultural forces at work in society that overflow the rational calculations said to be indicative 
of economic activity, but that economic activity itself is profoundly shaped by culture. The 
rationality of economic life , that is, is as much an artefact of the search for order by 
economists, themselves shaped by powerful myths, as it is a natural property of economic life 
itself. At the heart, just as with the other institutions, is belief. Taylor has argued that in 
Smith’s work, God becomes secularized: ‘God did not simply disappear but was reborn as the 
market’ (Taylor, 2004: 6).  The market then becomes the object of faith, in which practices, 
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such as the granting of credit, take their efficacy from a belief in shared rationalized myths. 
This for Taylor then becomes a ‘confidence game’ in which economic activity is based not on 
real world production but on belief in future states guided by forms of belief. One can see 
something similar in Mackenzie’s sociological work on the way in which economic theories 
of  practices such as hedging and derivatives are not simple mirrors of a pre-existing reality 
but actually bring that reality into existence. At the heart, to take Taylor’s argument, is an 
essentially theological position, in which the animating belief is something like ‘growth’, the 
faith that gain can be achieved. 
Politics 
Adam Smith can be seen as one of the foundations of a whole tradition of political economy. 
Boltanski and Thevenot (2006) base their arguments about the importance of spheres of 
worth on an extended discussion of the relationship between Smith moral philosophy and his 
economic theory, something which has been a matter of enduring debate. From this, in part, 
they derive their notion of the ‘civic world’, one in which the ‘general interest’ is the 
animating force. One sees in this the influence of French secular republicanism, a particular 
form of the nation state which was a defining feature of political theory and practice for 
centuries and which retains, in the face of globalisation, considerable power as a source of 
identity and worth. This can be seen as a particular form of ‘imagined community’ in the 
influential formation of Benedict Anderson (1991). ‘Imagined’ here does not mean 
‘imaginary’. It is rather a reference to those myths and symbols which form a basis for 
identity with others who may never be known. In this sense it can be seen to encompass the 
focus on communities in Thornton et al’s treatment, but to operate at different scales. It draws 
our attention to those practices, especially those embodied in ‘traditions’, which sustain such 
senses of community.  
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Traditions are placed in scare quotes to reflect the degree to which historians have explored 
the way in which they can be invented. Traditions, by their nature, are of ancient origin, with 
origin myths shrouded in the clouds of antiquity. On closer examination, however, traditions 
have been shown by historians to be creations of much more recent origin, often of deliberate 
instigation. In a seminal collection, a number of historians focussed on such creations 
showing, for example, that the tartan which lies at the heart of powerful images of Scottish 
identity, especially in modern brand management, is a creation of the early nineteenth 
century, owing much to the imaginative efforts of the novelist Sir Walter Scott (Hobsbawm 
and Ranger, 1992). In turn, this has spawned ‘traditions’, such as the ‘kirking of the tartan’ at 
‘Highland Games’ in the United States which were never seen in their supposed place of 
origin (Devine, 2012: 281). Of course, once emergent, such traditions can gain a life of their 
own and so deserve serious analysis for their effects, but history is a powerful means to 
debunk some of the more preposterous claims.   
‘Dancin’ in the streets’: play and aesthetics 
I turn now to perhaps my most surprising and provocative suggestion, but one which I hope 
to show is embedded both in historical accounts and in contemporary life: the notion of ‘play’ 
as a central institution, with its animating principle one of ‘fun’. Weber’s focus was on 
aesthetics but I seek to broaden this by drawing on the work of the Dutch art historian Johan 
Huizinga (1948). His work is fascinating in proposing play as an elemental component of 
civilization, one whose place he articulated in contrast and relation to a number of other 
categories: law, war, knowing, religion, poetry, philosophy and art. It can be seen that this list 
has striking parallels with the lists that we have examined so far, especially with that of 
Weber. Huizinga has interesting things to say in each connection, but for the current purpose 
I want to focus on the creation of a single category which has some form of creative 
representation of human existence at its core. For Huizinga, there were considerable 
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connections between some forms of artistic expression and play. Dancing, for example, ‘is a 
particular and particularly perfect form of playing’ (Huizinga, 1948: 165). However, his 
concerns, just as those of Weber, are marked by their time and place. This led to a focus on 
‘high art’ and the deploring of what for them, were, dangerous modern trends. Thus  
The supersession of the round dance, choral and figure dances by dancing a deux, 
whether this take the form of gyrating as in the waltz or polka or the slitherings and 
slidings and even acrobatics of contemporary dancing, is probably to be regarded as a 
symptom of declining culture (Huizinga, 1948: 164). 
What we have become more conscious of, and more tolerant of (if not more celebratory of), 
is the full range of what we term ‘culture’. It is interesting to note that Boltanski, together 
with another collaborator, Eve Chiapello, has argued for a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ 
(Boltanski and Ciapello, 2007). Once again drawing on management texts for its corpus of 
evidence, this suggests that the legacy of 1968 has been a freer form of management which 
challenges top down notions of command and control. It is surprising here that, apart from a 
passing mention, they fail to focus on popular music as a key carrier for such ideas (Parker, 
2008).  
Huizinga, writing in the 1940s, was sceptical about the role of play in modern society. For 
him, ‘the sad conclusion forces itself upon us that the play-element in culture has been on the 
wane ever since the 18th century, when it was in full flower’ (Huizinga, 1948: 2069). He saw 
developments such as the rise of organized sport as false play, because it was taken too 
seriously. An interesting suggestion made almost as an aside was ‘Business becomes play. 
This process goes so far that some of the great business concerns deliberately instil the play-
spirit into their workers so as to step up production. The trend is now reversed: play becomes 
business’ (Huizinga, 1948: 165). But if we take his focus seriously then it draws our attention 
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to the ways in which many areas of economic activity play is re-entering the workplace. From 
hi-tech offices to residential courses, play is promoted as a way of both attracting knowledge 
workers and of changing the nature of work. Figure 1 shows how this spirit is manifest in the 
most unlikely of places, where organizational announcements which once would have been 
couched in legalistic language are now expressed in a playful spirit. We can be sceptical 
about the ‘true’ level of fun that is expressed in such pronouncements, but it perhaps indicates 
to us the wider place of play in contemporary society. After all, it cannot be said that in the 
pursuit of fun there are not significant practices and specific organizational forms, from art 
galleries to symphony orchestras, from jazz bands to music festivals, several of which have 
featured in influential new institutionalist accounts. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
‘Knowing you, knowing me’: science and education 
The final value sphere that Weber considered was what he termed the ‘intellectual’ one; we 
noted above that knowing and philosophy were cardinal reference points for Huizinga as 
well. It is therefore mysterious, to use Thornton et al’s word, why this sphere has not featured 
in accounts of institutional logics more prominently. After all, most of those who write on the 
topic hail from what are termed, in another discourse, ‘institutions’, and confront in their 
working activities questions of the boundaries between their world and those of the ‘real’ 
world (as in the debate on relevance). In addition, for some, such as John Meyer (2008), the 
spread and development of higher education is a key element in the rationalization of the 
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modern world. It is also the domain which illustrates most clearly the carving out of 
significant areas of activity from the purview of religion. Indeed, this heritage is what gives 
added spice to the debates between science and religion. Ways of knowing the world, and 
their associated educational arrangements, start with control by a priesthood. As Weber notes 
The priesthood, as the only agents capable of conserving tradition, took over the 
training of youth in the law and often in purely administrative technologies, and, 
above all, in writing and calculus. The more religion became book-religion and 
doctrine, the more literary it became and the more efficacious it was in provoking 
rational lay-thinking, freed of priestly control (Gerth and Mills, 351). 
From this emerged the universities, firstly as specialist centres of theological training and 
then as broader centres. In some places, such as England, this religious function continued to 
colour the university curriculum for centuries; in others, such as Scotland, areas of more 
practical application such as medicine and geology appeared much sooner (Carter, 1990). We 
could argue here about what the appropriate word is for the animating substance, but I wish 
to settle on ‘curiosity’ as an animating principle which colours knowing practices across a 
range of disciplines. 
‘War! What is it good for?’: the military 
It is perhaps surprising that the military is not seen as a significant institution given its 
centrality in many of the practices and metaphors that permeate organizational life, notably 
the concept of strategy. It would seem to possess distinctive practices and organizational 
forms, together with a belief in values which often set its practitioners off from civilian life. 
Its centrality in the development of what we come to term modern life is stressed by Anthony 
Giddens (1990). He argues, in a discussion of what he terms ‘the institutional dimensions of 
modernity’ that there were four inter-linked factors in the rise of modernity: surveillance (the 
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growth of the state apparatus); capitalism; industrialism (which he takes to be the 
transformation of nature); and military power (Giddens, 1990: 55-63). Here there was a 
crucial link with the rise of the state, which developed a distinctive monopoly of the means of 
violence within particular boundaries. Although linked, however, the military develops 
distinctive practices of its own which are seen to separate it from the civilian world. Indeed, 
some of those practices, such as intensive drilling, have precisely the purpose of engendering 
such a separation, taking their meaning from a military logic. That logic might be expressed 
in a number of words – courage, reputation, glory, loyalty, are all candidates – but honour 
seems to express best this animating principle. 
‘I fought the law’ – the rule of law 
Finally, we come to a value sphere which Weber does not mention but which is surely central 
to his work on bureaucracy and rationalization. Interestingly, it is also a sphere where the 
work of an eminent historian provides us with support for the overall approach essayed here. 
The historian was E. P, Thompson, a leading British Marxist historian, but one implacably 
opposed to structuralist versions of Marxism, especially those operating with a 
conceptualisation of base and superstructure. This background and this opposition meant that 
he was more willing than many historians to elaborate his theoretical presuppositions. When 
he does so in his great book Whigs and Hunters it is illuminating for the general argument 
pursued here (Thompson, 1977). Thompson’s book is a study of the ‘Black Act’ of 1723, a 
vicious piece of class-based legislation which introduced a massive number of offences 
punishable by capital punishment. However, Thompson’s argument is that it is wrong to see 
law as just a reflection of class interests, for it had ‘its own characteristics, its own 
independent history and logic of evolution’(Thompson, 1977: 262). As he expressed it, as 
well as at times being permeated with particular instances of power,  
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The law may also be seen as ideology, or as particular rules and sanctions which stand 
in a definite and active relationship (often a field of conflict) to social norms; and, 
finally, it may be seen simply in terms of its own logic, rules and procedures – that is, 
simply as law. And it is not possible to conceive of any complex society without law 
(Thompson, 1977, 260). 
This nicely encapsulates some of the arguments that have been at the heart of this article. The 
major institutional spheres have their own logics, expressed in practices which take their 
meaning from ultimate commitments – justice, in the case of the law. That such practices 
imperfectly realise that commitment does not detract from it as an animating principle. Such 
practices create forms which are proper to that sphere. This bundle of practices and an 
animating substance endure because they express some sort of need arising from the 
interactions of humans with each other, with the natural world and with the search for 
meaning. 
DISCUSSION 
The institutions that have been sketched in here, with suggestions about their animating 
principle, their distinctive organizations and practices, are summarized in table 1.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Table 1 represents only the barest of summaries of the discussion. Selecting a word to 
represent substances which are often multi-faceted is challenging; organizations and practices 
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are indicative only and would merit much more elaboration. The discussion of each 
institution has, of necessity, to be brief; in this section I consider some general questions 
which span them all. I consider their mobility across time and space. I discuss contradictions 
and compromises both within and between institutions. I return to the discussion about 
institutional change. And I consider candidates for the status of institutions which arise from 
this discussion. 
One concern with much of the work in new institutionalism is that it appears bound to 
phenomena that are typical of the global north, especially the USA. That debate happens in 
other spheres as well. The validity of the application of a concept like ‘religion’ has been 
brought into question when detached from what are seen to be its origins in the consideration 
of western religions (Asad, 1993). This remains an open debate, but one consequence is the 
need to specify the concept at a level of abstraction which makes it transferable across time 
and space. Thus an important review defines religion as ‘any mythically sustained concern 
for ultimate meanings coupled with a ritually reinforced sense of social belonging’ (Demerath 
and Schmidt, 1998: 382). Of course, such a conceptualization is also potentially transferable, 
as Friedland suggests, to other institutional spheres. The idea of the outline in table one is that 
the spheres are potentially applicable across a range of temporally and spatially situated 
activities. Of course, the balance of each will be different and there is nothing in this 
formulation that suggests the primacy of any of them. In eighteenth century England, for 
example, Thompson suggests that  
the hegemony of the eighteenth century gentry and aristocracy was expressed, above 
all, not in military force, not in the mystifications of a priesthood or of the press, not 
even in economic coercion, but in the rituals of the study of the Justices of the Peace, 
in the quarter-sessions, in the pomp of the Assizes and in the theatre of Tyburn 
(Thompson, 1977: 262).1 
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 Thus it follows that any analysis has to consider the specificity of each institutional sphere in 
a particular time and place. To return to our focus on religion, Weber’s analysis of the 
relationship between religion and the economy covered, as we have seen, the major world 
religions. These had very different inflections, and these inflections changed over time. To 
take the example of lending at interest, Christianity developed a position of opposition in the 
Middle Ages but this shifted over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in different paces 
under the influence of different strains of Reformed Protestantism (Munro, 2011). 
Meanwhile, Islam continued its opposition, developing its own distinctive practices of 
lending money. However, much of the analysis of these changes rests at the level of formal 
statements of theological belief (Ali, 2005). If the conception of institutions put forward here 
has any purchase, then equal attention needs to be paid to the concomitant practices. This 
presents something of a research agenda. 
To continue with our example of religion for illustrative purposes, we can see that it 
generates distinctive forms of organization which mediate the relationship between substance 
and practice. The church is a way of organizing religious practice which is particularly 
associated with Christianity, but even here there are considerable differences in form, from 
the centralized control and hierarchy of Roman Catholicism to the local control of 
Congregationalism (Jeremy, 1998). This reminds us that there can be tensions and 
contradictions within specific instantiations of an overall institution. So not only are there 
different conceptions of what faith is taken to be between religions such as Christianity, 
Judaism and Islam, for example, but each tradition is itself internally divided. This points to 
the need to be specific about how a substance like ‘faith’ is interpreted and mobilised. The 
outline presented, that is, can only be a broad sketch which needs to be populated for specific 
instances. It has been my contention that history is vital to this act of population. 
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What history also points to is the enduring nature of institutions in a way which should give 
us pause in using the phrase ‘institutional change’. If we conceptualise institutions as being 
enduring in the way that historians envisage them, then such change happens but slowly and 
over long periods of time. This means that we need to be careful in seeing fields and 
organizations as mediators for the impact of institutions. Over time, changes in practice can 
shift logics at the level of the field, as carefully traced in the legal sphere by Smets, Morris 
and Greenwood (2012). In time, such changes may shift the meaning of the central 
institution, but this is likely to be over a much longer timescale and involve collective actors.  
I have suggested that the institutions I have outlined are ones which an examination of history 
shows are enduring facets of human existence, giving meaning to our interactions with each 
other and the natural world. That formulation might also suggest some other candidates for 
the status of institutions, which are offered here as speculations and invitations to debate. One 
might be seen as an enduring aspect of the human condition, the other as a more emergent 
institution. Both are concerned with our relation to the natural world. Given the embodied 
nature of human existence with its susceptibility to aging and disease, then a concern with 
ameliorating those susceptibilities might be thought to give rise to a medical logic. Medicine 
certainly has its distinctive practices, such as operations and its distinctive forms of 
organization, such as hospitals. Through its Hippocratic Oath it also has a statement of the 
values that lie at its heart, often ones which bring its practitioners into conflict with other 
value spheres. Whether this is sufficient to constitute it as an institutional sphere would 
require an account of its history that I am not familiar with. It could be argued that, while 
operating with specialised practices, that these are too sealed off from other aspects of life to 
constitute them as a meaning system which can then shape activities in other domains. A 
more hidden institution, and one which may have emergent candidate status, is that generated 
by our engagement with the natural world. We have noted that Giddens uses the rather 
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misleading term ‘industrialisation’ to express this relationship. He uses this to cover the 
creation of environments through technological innovation.  He contrasted this to a pre-
modern world in which ‘humans mostly saw themselves as continuous with nature’ (Giddens, 
1990: 56). Industrialization, in these terms, operated with a logic of the environment as a 
resource, something to be exploited. If there were foundations for this notion, they were 
probably supplied principally by Christianity, especially in its Protestant varieties. However, 
growing awareness of environmental degradation perhaps fosters a return to those traditions 
which promote an alternative logic of relationships with the natural world, one which focuses 
on resource conservation. Thinking about the environment as an institution, albeit an 
emerging one with developing practices, might be one way  
CONCLUSION 
We have noted that some organizations are specialised to particular institutions, but it is more 
likely that organizations stand at the confluence of number of competing value spheres 
(Kraatz and Block, 2008). And certainly, organizational members are likely to have been 
formed in different value spheres, giving rise to both tensions and to possibilities for 
innovation. The outline definition of institutions here, based on the ways in which historians 
have used the concept and have provided evidence for the ways in which institutions change 
and conflict over time, has been presented in order to address some of the concerns about 
conceptual clarity presented at the beginning of the article. In suggesting that institutions are 
responses to enduring relationships between humans and between humans and the natural 
world of which they are a part, I use the resources of history to resist any accusations of 
essentialism. While I suggest that there are enduring features of the human condition which 
do indeed rest on capacities which seem constitutive of human existence, notably the capacity 
to alter the environment and the capacity for language (which in turn fosters 
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conceptualizations of that environment), history indicates to us the plasticity of arrangements 
which can be generated by these capacities (O’Mahoney, 2012).  
Does attention to these factors draw our attention away from the analysis of organizations? Is 
an attempt to define institutions in this manner a transgression of disciplinary boundaries? It 
may be, but the argument of this article is that it is necessary from time to time to lift our 
head up from the ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’ of our own literature and look afresh at how 
others conceptualize the core issues. I have drawn upon a range of material which is probably 
unfamiliar to many readers of this journal, but there are remarkable echoes in the work of 
historians of some of the matters that concern us most.  
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Table 1: institutions and their attributes 
Institution Substance Organization Practice 
Religion Faith Church Prayer 
Family Love  Marriage 
Economy Gain Corporation Transaction 
Politics General interest State Voting 
Play Fun Gallery Game 
Knowledge Curiosity University Experiment 
Military Honour Army Drill 
Law Justice Court Pleading 
 
 
                                                            1 Tyburn being the place of execution in London 
